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ABSTRACT
The interaction between a creditor 
and a sovereign debtor is described 
as a ‘one-shot’ game with discrete 
actions—total or no debt-repudiation 
and seizure of asset holding abroad. 
Possible Nash equilibria where each 
player chooses an action as to 
maximise his expected payoff given 
his beliefs about the other player’s 
action and the implications of those 
actions on the players’ trustworthy 
reputation are identified. However, if 
reputation losses vary convexly with 
the players’ relative hostility, partial 
repudiation and seizure might be the 
preferred strategies. The preferred 
repudiation and seizure rates are 
analysed under asymmetric and 
symmetric information about the state 
of the world.
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the renewed growth of many developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America during the first half of the 1990s, the external 
debt crisis is far from being over. This crisis started in August 
1982 when Mexico could not service its external liabilities. Twelve 
and a half years later, in January 1995, the foreign exchange 
reserves of the very same country were almost halved to a mere 
$3.5 billion. Mexico's default on short-term liabilities has been 
prevented by a US-led rescue plan that included $50 billion of 
loan guarantees. However, the crisis has destabilised the stock- 
exchange markets in other Latin American countries and raised 
the level of scepticism about the ability of those countries to 
overcome their severe and prolonged external-debt problems. 
During the 1990s, many of the former centrally planned 
economies in East Europe have joined the club of the highly 
indebted countries. By the mid 1990s, the developing countries as 
a group have become more indebted than they were at any time 
during the 1980s. The aggregate external debts of the developing 
countries as a proportion of their combined gross domestic 
product reached about 40 per cent and for many of these 
countries the debt-service ratio (i.e., total interest and principal 
payments as a share of exports of goods and services) was at a 
crippling level (e.g., 77 per cent for Algeria, 64 per cent for Peru, 
and 41 per cent for Hungary in 1993).
As suggested by the debt-overhang hypothesis, an indebted 
country's investment, and consequently economic growth, might 
be adversely affected by its debt-service payments through the 
depletion of financial resources available for investment and 
expected and actual increase in tax rates, which in the presence 
of capital mobility discourages capital formation and repatriation 
of flight capital (Krugman, 1989; Helpman, 1989; and Dooley
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and Helpman, 1992). This crowding-out effect of actual debt 
service payments has been supported empirically by Boyce
(1992) and Cohen (1993). In view of this adverse effect, internal 
pressures, and the fact that a country's public external debt is a 
sovereign one and as such is not subject to incentive to repudiate 
external liabilities, might be moderated by the level of its asset 
holding abroad as creditors, official ones in particular, can 
respond by seizing these assets. Yet, seizure is a two-edge sword 
as it is also possible for an indebted country to seize the 
creditors' assets holding on its soil. It has also been suggested by 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kletzer (1984), Grossman and Van 
Huyck (1988, 1993), and Dooley and Svensson (1994), with 
Bulow and Rogoff's (1989) reservation for small countries facing 
competitive foreign investors, and empirically supported by Lee
(1993), that a country's incentive to repudiate external liabilities 
might also be moderated by a concern about the adverse effect of 
a default on its trustworthy reputation and subsequently on its 
access to foreign creditors.
The paper starts by analysing the strategic interaction between 
a creditor and a sovereign debtor within a game-theoretic 
framework whereby an indebted sovereign and a creditor decide 
on their repudiation and seizure strategies simultaneously, taking 
into account the implication of their actions on their trustworthy 
reputation. The novelty of the analysis is that trustworthy- 
reputation gains and losses are accruable to both players, and not 
only to the indebted country, and that these gains, or losses, vary 
in accordance with the nature of the interaction between the 
players. That is, the description of the players' payoffs takes into 
account the implications of being perceived as a villain when 
acting non-cooperatively and the benefits of being perceived 
righteous, or even as a victim, when playing cooperatively for 
future interactions of the creditor and the indebted sovereign with 
other players. For instance, in a case of repudiation, the losses for
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the creditor from not seizing the indebted country's asset holding 
abroad when he could do so are moderated by the gain of 
trustworthy reputation from acting cooperatively and non- 
aggressively toward the indebted country. These reputation gains 
are likely to be larger in the event of repudiation than in the case 
of debt repayment, and may significantly improve the creditor's 
bargaining power in the international credit market. In such a 
case, the unprovoked defaulting debtor might suffer from a 
substantial loss of trustworthy reputation. Similarly, a seizure of 
an indebted country's asset holding abroad, especially when the 
indebted country repays its debt, can adversely affect the 
trustworthy reputation of a creditor while enhancing the 
trustworthy reputation of the cooperatively acting debtor.
As in any other game-theoretic analysis, the drawback of the 
above approach is that the strategies available to the players are 
of a discrete nature — either total repudiation of debt and seizure 
of asset-holding abroad, or no repudiation and seizure. From the 
players' perspectives, the optimality of such discrete actions is 
questionable if their reputation losses rise convexly with the 
relative hostility of their actions. Moreover, the players' 
reputation losses might be affected by the state of the world at 
the time the game takes place. A default of an indebted country is 
likely to be more excusable when that country suffers from harsh 
natural, social, political and economic conditions than when it 
enjoys favourable ones. Similarly, a hostile behaviour of a creditor 
toward a sovereign in distress is likely to be condemned by the 
international community. These elements are incorporated into 
the design of quadratic reputation loss functions which play a 
key role in the expected-return maximisation analysis of the 
repudiation and seizure rates under asymmetric information and, 
alternatively, under symmetric information.
The analysis is organised in the following manner. Section 2 
describes the strategy combinations available to the indebted
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sovereign and the creditor as zero or total repudiation and 
seizure and the payoffs associated with these strategies. It then 
identifies the possible Nash-equilibria in pure strategies under 
various assumptions about the constituents of the players' 
payoffs. Section 3 relaxes the assumption of zero-one repudiation 
and seizure rates and analyses the optimal repudiation and 
seizure rates associated with convex reputation loss functions, 
uncertainty about the well-being of the indebted sovereign and 
asymmetric information. Section 4 generates the indebted 
sovereign's and the creditor's choice of repudiation and seizure 
rates under the alternative assumption of symmetric information. 
This section also highlights the complex effect of the probability 
of a 'bad' state of world on the optimal repudiation and seizure 
rates. Section V concludes the paper.
2. REPUDIATION, SEIZURE AND REPUTATION IN A 'ONE-
SHOT' GAME
The strategies available to the indebted sovereign in the game 
considered in this section are: (i) repayment of the debt, (ii) 
repudiation of the debt, or (iii) both repudiation of the debt and 
seizure of the creditor's asset holding in the indebted country. 
Similarly, the strategies available to the creditor are: (a) no 
seizure of the indebted country's asset holding in the creditor 
country, or (b) seizure of these assets.
Let,
D = the book value of the sovereign debt,
Ad = the indebted country's asset-holding in the 
creditor country,
Ac = the creditor's asset holding in the indebted 
country,
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RGd = the reputation gains for the indebted country from
In 1acting cooperatively (with RG^ > RG^),
RGC = the reputation gains for the creditor from acting 
cooperatively (with RG^ > RG™ > RC*),
RLd = the repudiation losses for the indebted country 
from not acting cooperatively (with R L ^  > RL ĵ
> RL“  > RLj), and
RLC = the repudiation losses for the indebted country 
from not acting cooperatively (with RL^ > RL™
> RL )̂.
Then the possible types of interaction between the indebted 
sovereign and the creditor and their associated payoffs can be 
formulated as displayed in the following payoff matrix where the 
entries on the left-hand side indicate the indebted country's 
payoffs and those on the right-hand side represent the creditor's 
payoffs.
(I)
D Repay 
E
b  <n>
.j. Repudiate
O (HI)
R Repudiate 
& Seize
C R E D I T O R
(a) Not Seize (b) Seize
(Ad-  D + RCd ),(AC + D + RG j.) (RGd -D ) ,(A c+ A d + D - R L ^ )
(Ad- R L d )>(Ac + RG C ) (-RLd),(Ac+ Ad -  RL™)
(Ad+ A c- R L Vd ),(RGj) (AAc-RL^),(Ad - R L c )
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In view of the severe implications of strategies such as debt 
repudiation or asset seizure on the continuation of the 
relationship between the parties involved, it is reasonable to 
analyse the interaction between an indebted sovereign and a 
creditor (or a syndicate of creditors) within the framework of a 
'one-shot' game rather than a repeated one. It is postulated that 
each player chooses an action that maximises his expected 
payoff given his beliefs about the other player's action and the 
implications of those actions on the players' trustworthy 
reputation. This payoff-maximising behaviour, as well as the 
strategies available to the players and their associated payoffs, 
are considered to be common knowledge. Since the players' 
constrained maximisation problems are linear in the action- 
probability vector, the players can be better off by choosing pure 
strategies rather than mixed ones.
The possible Nash equilibria in pure strategies can be found by 
analysing the best response of each player to what he believes 
would be the other player's strategy choice. The results of this 
analysis are summarised by the following propositions whose 
proofs are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1
If (i) RGd -  D > -  Rl JJ, (ii) RG^ -  D > Ac -  RLVdh, and 
1 In
(iii) RGC > Ad -  RLC, then the co-operative combination of
repayment and non-seizure (I,a) is a Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies.
Proposition 2
If (i) -  R L j > RGd -  D, (ii) -  RLd > Ac -  RLVdh, and
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(iii) RG c > Ad -  RL c , then the combination of repudiation and 
non-seizure (II,a) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 3
If (i) Ac -  RLVdh > -  RLd, (ii) Ac -  RLVdh > RGd -  D and
(iii) RGc > Ad -  RL*, then the combination (III,a) in which the
indebted sovereign repudiates his debt and seizes the creditor's 
asset holding in his territory, while the creditor is refrained from 
seizing the indebted sovereign asset holding abroad, is a Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 4
If (i) RGd -  D > -  RLd, (ii) Rg J  -  D > Ac -  RL™, and 
h 1
(iii) Ad -  RLC > RGC, then the combination (I,b) in which the
indebted sovereign repays his debt and the creditor seizes the 
indebted country's asset holding abroad is a Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies.
Proposition 5
If (i) -  RLld > R g J  -  D, (ii) -  RLd > Ac -  RL™, and
(iii) Ad -  RL™ > RG™, then the combination (II,b) in which the
indebted country repudiates its debt and the creditor seizes the 
indebted country's asset holding abroad is a Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies.
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Proposition 6
If (i) Ac -  R L j  > RGS -  D, (ii) Ac -  RL^ > -  R L j, and
(iii) Ad -  RL  ̂ > RG^, then the combination (III,b) in which the
indebted country repudiates its debt and also seizes the 
creditor's assets held on its territory, while the creditor is seizing 
the indebted country's asset holding abroad, is a Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies.
3 . C O N V E X  R EP U T A T IO N  L O S S  FU N C T IO N S, A SY M M E T R IC  
IN FO R M A T IO N  AN D  TH E O PT IM A L  R EPU D IA T IO N  AN D  
SE IZ U R E  R A T E S
The above game-theoretic analysis was based on extreme modes 
of response (i.e., either complete seizure and repudiation or no 
seizure and repudiation) and their associated fixed losses, or 
gains, of trustworthy reputation. However, if reputation losses 
vary with the relative intensity of the players' responses in a 
convex way, partial repudiation and seizure can be the preferred 
responses. The present section analyses the implications of such 
convex reputation-loss functions where both players have already 
set up their mind to play non-cooperatively. Moreover, a state-of- 
world's effect is incorporated into the reputation-loss functions in 
order to distinguish between a 'good' state of world and a 'bad' 
one. A 'good' state of world is characterised by favourable 
natural, social, political and economic conditions for the indebted 
sovereign, whereas a 'bad' state of world is an alignment of 
unfavourable conditions lowering the indebted sovereign's ability 
to service external liabilities. Therefore, in a 'bad' state of world 
repudiation of some of the external liabilities might be more 
excusable and hence generating lower reputation loss than in a
'good' state of world. Similarly, official creditors might suffer 
from relatively high reputation loss from seizing the asset holding 
abroad of a sovereign in distress.
To simplify matters, the analysis considers the case where the 
creditor's asset holding in the indebted country is negligible and 
where the creditor's repudiation loss (CRL) is quadratic in the 
ratio of the assets seized to the repudiated liabilities. In this 
setting the creditor's reputation loss from seizing the indebted 
sovereign asset holding abroad in a 'good' state of world is given
where s is the seizure rate (0 < s < 1), r is the repudiation rate of
the quadratic loss function in a 'good' and a 'bad' states of 
world, respectively, and the ratio inside the parentheses indicates 
the extent of the creditor's hostility relatively to that of the 
indebted sovereign.
Similarly, it is assumed that the indebted sovereign reputation 
loss (ISRL) rises with the ratio of the repudiated debt to the 
seized assets as displayed by the following quadratic forms:
by
(1)
and in a 'bad' state of world by
c c
external liabilities (0 < r < 1), > Cg > 0 are the coefficients of
(3)
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in a 'good' state of world, and
ISRLfc =c" (ss)2 w
in a 'bad' state of world. Here, Cg > > 0 are the coefficients
of the debtor's quadratic reputation-loss functions in 'good' and 
'bad' states of world, respectively, reflecting that repudiation in a 
'good' state of world is less excusable than in a 'bad' state of 
world. The ratio inside the parentheses displays the extent of the 
indebted sovereign's hostility relatively to that of the creditor.
It is also assumed that the creditor and the indebted sovereign 
perceive the probability of a 'bad' state of world as a positive 
scalar within the open unit interval nc and 7t<j, respectively, and 
that both maximise expected net returns. It is likely that 7tc  ̂
as it is natural that the creditor is less informed about the 
indebted country's affairs. In this case, one can argue that it is in 
the interest of both the creditor and the indebted sovereign to act 
immediately rather than waiting for the realisation of the state of 
world. The underlying rationale is that by delaying action to the 
realisation of the state of world the creditor, who is less 
informed, is running the risk of losing a collateral if a 'bad' state 
of world is realised, as such a delay might give the indebted 
sovereign, who has the information edge, an opportunity to 
liquidate and repatriate his asset holding abroad. Similarly, a 
rational indebted sovereign is aware of the creditor's reluctance to 
delay an action, and hence will not delay his action too. By 
delaying repudiation the indebted sovereign is running the risk of 
fully servicing his debt while the creditor is seizing some of his 
asset holding abroad.
In view of the above arguments, the net return for the creditor
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is distributed as
(1-r) D + sAd - CRL| 1 - nc
y = (5)
(1-r) D + sAd - CRLb
and the distribution of the indebted sovereign's net return is
(1-s) A d - (1 - r) D  - ISR L| 1 - nd
(6)
(1-s) A d - (1-r) D - ISR Lb 7td
where the superscript e associated with the reputation loss terms 
indicates the creditor's and the indebted sovereign's assessments 
of their reputation loss given their expectations about the 
intensity of each other's actions re and se, respectively. Assuming 
that they both believe that reputation losses are generated in 
accordance with the above-mentioned quadratic forms, then
(8)
(9)
and
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The maximisation of E(y) and the convexity of the creditor's 
reputation-loss function imply that the creditor's optimal seizure 
rate is
so .  ---------- ilfD li---------- . (11)
2[(l-jtc)Cg +7rcCb]Ad
This indicates that the optimal seizure rate:
i. rises with the repudiation rate perceived by the creditor,
ii. rises with the sovereign's external liabilities,
iii. declines with the indebted sovereign's asset holding abroad, 
and
iv. declines with the probability of a 'bad' state of world (since 
Cb > Cg > 0).
Similarly, the maximisation of E(x) and the convexity of the 
reputation loss functions imply that the indebted sovereign's best 
choice of rate of repudiation is
r° -  --------- (S6dAd>2 „ • (12) 
2[(l-7Td)Cg + 7tdCb]D
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That is, the indebted sovereign's optimal repudiation rate of 
external liabilities:
i. rises with the perceived seizure rate of his asset holding 
abroad and the size of these assets,
ii. declines with the sovereign's external debt, and
iii. rises with the perceived probability of a 'bad' state of world
(since Cg > > 0).
4. OPTIMAL REPUDIATION AND SEIZURE RATES WHEN
INFORMATION IS SYMMETRIC
While the previous section's analysis of the creditor's and the 
indebted sovereign's optimal actions considered the case of 
asymmetric information about the state of the world, the 
following analysis considers the less likely case where the 
perceptions of both the creditor and debtor about the probability 
of the state of world are identical, i.e., %c = -  p, and where the 
creditor and the indebted sovereign know each other's reputation 
loss functions and objectives. In this case, the expectations of the 
creditor and the indebted sovereign about each other's actions are 
correct (i.e., re = r° and se = s°). Although not suffering from 
information disadvantage about the state of the world, the 
creditor still faces the risk of losing a collateral by delaying 
seizure and hence can be expected to act immediately. Being 
aware of the creditor's concerns and consideration, the indebted 
sovereign can also be expected to act immediately and repudiate 
some of the external liabilities.
The substitution of p for nc and t i j and the optimal seizure 
rate (11) into the optimal repudiation rate equation (12) implies 
that the optimal rate of repudiation when information is
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symmetric is given by
2[(l-p)Cg + pcJ]l/3 [(l-p)Cg + p C b F3
(13)D
Similarly, the substitution of p for rcc and %<j and the optimal 
repudiation rate into the optimal seizure rate equation implies 
that the optimal seizure rate in the case of symmetric information
The above results indicate that under symmetric information the 
optimal repudiation rate declines with the size of the sovereign's 
external debt and that the optimal seizure rate declines with the 
size of the indebted sovereign's asset holding abroad. The total 
differentiation of the above equalities indicates further that the 
effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of world on the optimal 
repudiation and seizure rates is not clear a priori and depends 
upon the relative size of the coefficients of the reputation loss 
functions. The underlying rationale for this ambiguity is as 
follows. Recalling that the optimal seizure rate rises with the 
repudiation rate perceived by the creditor, which in the present 
setting is equal to the optimal one, and recalling that the effect of 
the probability of a 'bad' state of world perceived by the 
indebted sovereign on his optimal seizure rate is positive, then the 
indirect effect (i.e., through re) of the probability of a 'bad' state 
of world on the creditor's optimal seizure rate is positive. 
However, the direct effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of
2[(l-p)Cg + p C b F 3 [(l-p)Cg + Pc£]2/3
(14)
Ad
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world (i.e., the effect of the creditor's own expectations about 
this probability) on the creditor's optimal seizure rate is negative. 
Thus, the full (direct plus indirect) effect of the probability of a 
'bad' state of world on the optimal seizure rate can be positive, 
negative or nil depending on the relative size of the coefficients of 
the quadratic reputation-loss functions specified earlier. 
Similarly, recall that the optimal repudiation rate rises with the 
seizure rate perceived by the indebted sovereign and that when 
information is symmetric the latter factor is equal to the optimal 
seizure rate which was shown to be declining with the creditor's 
perceived probability of a 'bad' state of world. Therefore, the 
indirect effect (i.e., the effect through se) of the probability of a 
'bad' state of world on the optimal repudiation rate is negative. 
In contrast, the direct effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of 
world (i.e., the effect of the indebted sovereign's own assessment 
of this probability) on the optimal repudiation rate is positive. 
Thus, the full effect of p on r° is not clear as well.
Note that when the coefficients of the creditor's and the 
indebted sovereign's reputation loss function are similar in 
magnitudes (i.e., both are treated similarly for non-cooperative 
behaviour), the opposite direct and indirect effects stemming 
from a change in the probability of a 'bad' state of world are of a 
similar magnitude and hence the changes in the optimal 
repudiation and seizure rates are relatively small. This point, as 
well as the possibility of counter intuitive changes, is illustrated 
by Table 1 which allows the probability of the 'bad' state of 
world to vary from 0.1 to 0.9 while holding D = 12 billion dollars,
Ad = 2.4 billion dollars, Cg = 0.8 = and = 0.4 = Cg. In
this example, the optimal repudiation rate rises by only 1.76 
percentage point and the optimal seizure rate declines by only 
8.79 percentage points as the probability of a 'bad' state of world 
hikes from 0.1 to 0.9.
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Table 1 Simulated effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of 
the world with identical reputation loss' coefficients 
and under symmetric information
Probability of 
'bad' state of 
world
Optimal
repudiation
rate
Optimal
seizure
rate
0.1000 0.0880 0.5278
0.3000 0.0948 0.5182
0.5000 0.1000 0.5000
0.7000 0.1036 0.4739
0.9000 0.1056 0.4399
Finally, let the creditor's reservation price (Pc) be defined as 
the ratio of E(y) to D, then by virtue of equations 5 and 11 the 
creditor's reservation price of a dollar of debt associated with s°
Pc = r - r e (15)
which in the case of symmetric information implies
1 - 2[(l-p)Cg + pCb]1/3 [(1 - p)Cg + pCCb]2/3 
Pc = p  . (16)
In contrast to simple intuition, this result indicates that the 
creditor's reservation price of a sovereign debt rises with the size 
of the debt. Again, and as explained earlier, the full effect of the 
probability of a 'bad' state of world on the creditor's reservation 
price is not clear a priori.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper analysed the interaction between the creditor and 
the indebted sovereign and identified the possible Nash equilibria 
in pure strategies within the framework of a 'one-shot' game. The 
payoffs of the game included reputation gains and losses for the 
players as their current behaviour, in conjunction with their 
opponent's behaviour, might affect their future payoffs from 
dealing with other lenders or borrowers in the international credit 
market. It was shown that the possibility of any strategy 
combination to be Nash equilibrium in pure strategies depends on 
these trustworthy reputations gains and losses, the size of the 
debt and the asset holding of each of the players in the other 
player's country.
The introduction of convex reputation loss functions suggested 
that partial repudiation and seizure of asset holding abroad 
might be preferred to the total or no repudiation and seizure 
strategies considered by the game. These partial repudiation and 
seizure were analysed under the alternative assumptions of 
asymmetric and symmetric information about the state of world. 
The analysis indicated that in the case of asymmetric information 
optimal seizure rate rises with the repudiation rate perceived by 
the creditor and the sovereign's external liabilities and declines 
with the indebted sovereign's asset holding abroad and the 
probability of a 'bad' state of world. It was also found that in the 
case of asymmetric information, the indebted sovereign's optimal 
repudiation rate declines with the sovereign's external debt but 
rises with the perceived seizure rate of his asset holding abroad, 
the size of these assets and the perceived probability of a 'bad' 
state of world. In the case of symmetric information, it was found 
that the direct and indirect effects of the probability of a 'bad' 
state of world are of opposite signs and hence their combined 
effect on the repudiation and seizure rates is not clear a priori.
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APPENDIX
Proof o f Proposition 1: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and the 
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will not seize his asset 
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to repay 
his debt. When the indebted sovereign repays his debt, it is 
optimal for the creditor not to seize the indebted country's asset 
holding abroad as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 2: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the 
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will not seize his asset 
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to 
repudiate. Note further that when the indebted sovereign 
repudiates, it is optimal for the creditor not to seize the indebted 
country's liabilities as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 3: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the 
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will not seize his asset 
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to 
repudiate the debt and to seize the creditor's asset held in his 
territory. When the indebted sovereign repudiates and seizes, it is 
optimal for the creditor not to seize the indebted country's 
liabilities as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 4: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the 
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will seize his asset 
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to repay 
its debt. When the indebted sovereign repays his debt, it is 
optimal for the creditor to seize the indebted country's liabilities 
as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 5: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the 
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will seize his asset
18
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to 
repudiate its debt. When the indebted sovereign defaults, it is 
optimal for the creditor to seize the indebted country's liabilities 
as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 6: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the 
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will seize his asset 
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to 
repudiate its debt and to seize the creditor's assets held in its 
territory. When the indebted sovereign does so, it is optimal for 
the creditor to seize the indebted country's liabilities as long as 
inequality (iii) holds.
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